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TORTS
GEORGE SAVAGE KING*
Several torts cases during the period of this review pre-
sented novel questions for the Court's decision. Probably the
most significant is Hall v. Murphy' in which the Supreme
Court decided that a negligent defendant could be liable for
pre-natal injuries to a viable child born alive. It was in
1958 that the Court decided that it would not allow a cause
of action for the wrongful death of a child born dead. In
the Hall case, the child was born prematurely and lived only
four hours. The child's death resulted from injuries sus-
tained in a collision between the automobile of the defendant
and that which the mother of the decedent was riding.
The Court reviewed the change in the decisions over the
past fifteen years concluding that in a majority of the cases
arising during this period actions of this nature had been
allowed. The Court noted that a few other jurisdictions have
gone further and held that an action may be maintained even
if an infant had not reached the state of a viable fetus at
the time of the injury. It specifically reserved that question
for the future. For a discussion of some of the factors in
the Court's reasoling in this case, the reader is referred to
this reviewer's comments in the Spring 1961 issue of the
South Carolina Law Quarterly.2
The second landmark case decided during this period by the
Court is the one of Wallace v. A. H. Guion and Company.3 The
defendant was engaged in excavating a large ditch in which
to lay sewer pipe on property at the rear of the plaintiff's lot
and within two hundred feet of his residence. In the course
of his work the defendant exploded great amounts of dyna-
mite or other high explosives which resulted in vibrations
and shock or concussion waves which caused extensive dam-
ages to the plaintiff's home.
Plaitiff's complaint did not allege any negligence on the
part of the defendant in the use of high explosives or the
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 236 S. C. 257, 113 S. E. 2d 790 (1960).,
2. 13 S. C. L. Q. 394, at 396-397 (Spring, 1961).
3. 237 S. C. 249, 117 S. E. 2d 359 (1960).
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manner of excavation. By demurrer the question was pre-
sented to the Court whether the plaintiff would have to
establish negligence on the part of the defendant in order
to recover for damage done to his property when no debris
was cast upon the land of the plaintiff by the acts of the
defendant. The Court followed the lead of the modern cases
throughout this country and acknowledged that the defend-
ant's conduct is so dangerous by its nature that, though
such conduct is not illegal, it is only just that he pay for
damages actually done to the property of others in the con-
duct of his business. The early South Carolina case, Harris
v. Simon,4 was distinguished from the principal case because
in the Harris case the appeal was concerned solely with the
sufficiency of the evidence of negligence, the plaintiff having
undertaken to plead and prove negligence. The Court also
referred to the case of Momeier v. Koepig5 in which opinion
it was said of the Harris case "that [it] apparently holds that
in blasting cases proof of negligence is required to support
a verdict for damages," and said the statement was not
accurate and was to be disregarded as dictum. Perhaps the
greatest significance of the Wallace case is that it clearly
establishes the fact that South Carolina accepts the rule that
liability for blasting is not predicated on negligence but is
absolute.
In the case of Pinkston v. Morrall6 it was determined that
a city's liability for negligence of a truck driver employee,
under the statute giving one injured by a motor vehicle en-
gaged in the business of the city the right to sue the city,
is limited to those situations in which the city's negligence is
the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. The plaintiff's
complaint had alleged that his injury was by reason of the
joint and concurrent negligence, carelessness and recklessness
of the named defendant and the city. The Court found that
it was not the intention of the legislature to abrogate the
city's immunity in these situations. The case involved a dis-
cussion of the proviso to the statute permitting suit against
a city which was added by amendment in 1949 and which
reads as follows:
... No recovery may be had hereunder if the plaintiff
has brought about such~injury, death or damage by his
4. 32 S. C. 593, 10 S. E. 1076 (1889).
5. 220 S. C. 124, 66 S. E. 2d 465 (1951).
6. 236 S. C. 601, 115 S. E. 2d 286 (1960).
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negligence or negligently or carelessly contributed there-
to or if such plaintiff's injury or damage was brought
about by the contributory negligence of any third per-
son .... 7 [Emphasis added.]
The italicized portion of the statute was the part which
precipitated the issue in the case. The plaintiff had con-
tended that the term "contributory negligence" in its usual
legal context refers only to negligence of a plaintiff and
therefore did not bar an action where the negligence con-
tributed was by a joint tortfeasor. The Court said that it
was convinced that this language was used to indicate that
the legislature intended no action to lie unless the defendant
municipality was solely responsible for the action because the
contributory negligence of a plaintiff was expressly covered
in the preceding provision of the Statute.
FRAUD
In the case of Lancaster v. Smithco, Inc.8 the plaintiff,
who purchased a house and lot from the defendant, sued
in fraud because the general warranty deed made no reference
to the fact that the defendant had given an easement ninety
feet wide across the rear of the lot for the purpose of in-
stalling gas pipe lines to a public utility. The Court pointed
to the fact that the gist of a tort action for fraud is intent
to deceive. In this case the plaintiff had relied entirely on
the absence of a reference to the easement as evidence of the
defendant's intent to deceive. The Court noted the question
was a novel one and held that a mere omission of a reference
to the easement in the deed was not sufficient to establish,
the intent to deceive necessary to maintain an action for
fraud and deceit and reversed plaintiff's judgment. The
Court refused to express any opinion as to whether or not
the evidence would justify finding a breach of warranty,
having pointed out earlier that the information as to the
easement was readily available to the plaintiff if he had
checked the plat in the records at the courthouse.
In Warr v. Carolina Power & Light Co.9 the plaintiff sold
his land to the defendant power company for the purpose
of planting and growing pine trees thereon. Later he dis-
7. Id. at 603, 115 S. E. 2d at 287 (1960).
8. 238 S. C. 15, 119 S. E. 2d 145 (1961).
9. 237 S. C. 121, 115 S. E. 2d 799 (1960).
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covered that the real purpose for which the land was pur-
chased was the creation of a lake to be used for power gen-
erating purposes. Plaintiff had been paid $43 an acre for
several hundred acres. He learned that other parties in the
area had been paid as much as $200 an acre for similar
land which was to be used with plaintiff's for the lake site.
Plaintiff brought this action in fraud and deceit contending
the defendant's agent had misrepresented the purpose to
which the land would be used and that he would not have
sold it for the price he did if the true purpose had been dis-
,closed to him. Plaintiff alleged that defendant's agent acted
-with the intention to deceive and that he was deceived by the
misrepresentations of the defendant, that the plaintiff was
-damaged by such misrepresentations in that he sold the land
for less than the defendant had paid for similar land. The
-demurrer having been overruled by the trial court, defend-
;ant appealed. The Court found the plaintiff's failure to
.allege facts which showed actual damage to the plaintiff
-sufficient to determine the case. The plaintiff had alleged
-that other persons had been paid a greater price for their
'land than the plaintiff had been paid for his even though
-the lands were bought for the same purpose by the defendant.
'The Court pointed out that this was no proof that the plain-
tiff received any less than what his land was actually worth.
'There was no indication that the plaintiff's use of his re-
'maining land was in any way damaged by the purposes to
'vhich the defendant put the land that he purchased from the
plaintiff, or that plaintiff would have received any benefit
if defendant had used the land for planting trees as was
represented to plaintiff.
In the case of Outlaw v. Calhoun Life Insurance Co.10 the
defendant demurred to the plaintiff's complaint in which it
'was alleged that the defendant had fraudulently obtained a
release from the plaintiff for benefits due under a policy
,of insurance. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff had
been presented with a release which did not indicate the
amount of the settlement. She alleged that she signed be-
lieving it to be a receipt for the full amount of the accidental
death benefits to which she was entitled under the policy
for the death of her son. When the insurance company's draft
'vas subsequently presented to her and she saw for the first
10. 236 S. C. 272, 113 S. E. 2d 817 (1960).
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time the amount of the settlement, which was for natural
death benefits and not the double indemnity amount, she then
insisted that the release be returned to her and that the com-
pany take back the draft. This the company refused to do.
The defendant demurred on the ground that the plaintiff had
signed a valid release and that she was not a person in-
capable of reading and knowing the contents thereof. The
trial court's overruling of the demurrer was sustained on
this appeal on the ground that the complaint alleged that
the plaintiff signed the release without having any means to
ascertain from it the amount for which she was signing. The
Court added that the defendants, if they presented the release
to her without disclosing the exact amount of the settlement,
had to do so knowingly and that this was in fact a mis-
representation. The Court took this occasion to reiterate the
rule which it had stated earlier in the case of Jones v. Cooper1
that one cannot complain of fraud in the misrepresentation of
the contents of a written instrument when the truth could
have been ascertained by reading the instrument.
DEFAMATION
In the case of Renew v. Serby12 the Supreme Court re-
versed a judgment of $2,500 for the plaintiff for slander
in which the defendant was alleged to have charged the
plaintiff with unchastity, and was therefore actionable with-
out proof of special damages. The appeal was on the ground
that defendant's remarks were not susceptible of the inference
that plaintiff was charged with unchastity. The language
used by the defendant manager to the plaintiff, an employee
of the defendant's garment manufacturing plant, was in the
presence of two other employees, one male and one female.
The defendant said of the plaintiff, "This is my girl," to
which she replied "No, I'm not." A few moments later, de-
fendant told plaintiff that she would have to work the next
day and then continued, "You will have to break that date
tonight," to which plaintiff responded that she was married
and had a date every night. Defendant then said, "You go
home and tell your husband he cannot have any of that stuff
tonight, but you will work tomorrow."
The Supreme Court concluded that, "At their worst, they
[the remarks of the defendant] could have been taken as
11. 234 S. C. 477, 109 S. E. 2d 5 (1959).
12. 237 S. C. 116, 115 S. E. 2d 664 (1960).
1[9621
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suggesting that she forego marital intercourse in favor of
illicit relations with Serby."
At common law, to charge want of chastity to a woman is
not actionable without a showing of special damages. Al-
though not mentioned in the pleadings, nor in the order of
the trial court refusing judgment n.o.v., nor in the Supreme
Court's opinion, the plaintiff's action could be maintained only
on the right granted by a statute'13 first enacted in 1824. The
general rule in slander cases, contrary to that in libel cases,
is that special damages must be shown unless the slander
comes within one of four exceptions. In this case plaintiff
failed to plead any special damages and therefore, when it
was determined that defendant's remarks were not within
the exception-here, accusing a woman of unchastity-he
was unable to maintain the suit. Although it is not difficult
to agree with the Supreme Court in this case that the lan-
guage used by the defendant did not warrant an inference
that the plaintiff was guilty of unchastity, it illustrates the
kind of conduct which a defendant can engage in deliberately
and with no motive other than an ulterior one, and still escape
legal liability. Protection by the law of the right of persons
such as the plaintiff to be free from embarrassments such
as the defendant subjected her to, would tend to keep down
breaches of the peace. It is somewhat surprising that this
incident did not precipitate a physical attack by the hus-
band of the plaintiff on the defendant when the plaintiff and
her husband returned to the plant to inquire about the defend-
ant's having said what the plaintiff charged him with having
said.
In Costas v. Florence Printing Co.14 the plaintiff, who was
the operator of a drive-in restaurant located just east of the
city of Florence, contended that his reputation was damaged
by an article in the defendant's newspaper. The article com-
plained of was one reporting the fact that there had been
two youths arrested for disorderly conduct at the place of
business of the defendant. It also referred to the fact that
these two youths had earlier been charged with armed rob-
bery. The trial court overruled the defendant's demurrer and
the defendant appealed on the grounds that the language used
was not susceptible of any inference which would be damag-
13. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 10-2591 (1952).
14. 237 S. C. 655, 118 S. E. 2d 696 (1961).
[Vol. 14
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ing to the plaintiff and his business. The Supreme Court
reversed, using the following language:
We have examined the alleged libelous article set forth
in the complaint herein and it contains no statement
from which it could be reasonably implied that the re-
spondent had any connection with the arrest made at
his place of business; nor does it impute to him or any
of his employees any wrongdoing or condonation of
wrongful conduct. Certainly, the words complained of
do not charge the respondent with any crime, nor with
the operation of a disorderly place of business.l"
The plaintiff pleaded no extrinsic circumstances which
gave any special meaning to the article as published and the
Court said that the language would therefore be taken in its
usual meaning. It could find nothing defamatory and held
that the demurrer should have been sustained.
Holding that a qualified privilege is a matter of defense
and not available on a demurrer to an action for libel, the
Supreme Court, in Porter v. News & Courier Company,16
affirmed the trial court's overruling of the defendant's de-
murrer. The Court also found that the story published by
the defendant could reasonably be understood to have charged
the plaintiff with larceny or breach of trust when it re-
counted his having been erroneously paid more than the
amount of a check he cashed at a store, his subsequent use
of the excess money, his prosecution therefor and his prompt
acquittal. Such a charge was libelous per se, it not being
necessary to charge one with a crime by name.
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
In the federal case of South Carolina, Natural Gas Com-
pany v. Phillips 17 the plaintiff sought to recover for damages
to its property suffered as a result of an explosion and fire
which occurred when an independent contractor, King, was
undertaking to remove earth from the plaintiff's right-of-
way above the plaintiff's natural gas pipeline. The defend-
ant was a general contractor for a housing development for
the Air Force at its Charleston Air Base. The defendant had
let a sub-contract to King to do grading and filling necessary
15. Id. at 662-663, 118 S. E. 2d at 699 (1961).
16. 237 S. C. 102, 115 S. E. 2d 656 (1960).
17. 289 F. 2d 143 (1961).
1962]
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on the housing site. There was nothing in the contract be-
tiveen King and the defendant specifying the source from
which the sub-contractor was to acquire the fill. On his own
initiative the sub-contractor obtained from the South Carolina
Public Service Authority permission to remove certain earth
which was under the power transmission lines of the Author-
ity along its one hundred foot wide right-of-way paralleling
the western boundary of the construction site. In attempting
to remove the earth fill the sub-contractor's servants, op-
erating a thirty-ton pan earth remover, went beyond the
right-of-way of the Authority onto an adjoining one hundred
foot right-of-way of the plaintiff which also carried electric
power transmission lines overhead. There were no signs or
markers indicating the presence of the gas transmission line
beneath the surface and neither King nor his servant had
actual knowledge of its presence. The sub-contractor's ser-
vant ruptured the gas line when he scraped it with the blade
of the machine and caused a spark sufficient to ignite es-
caping gas. At the trial in the federal district court, in which
King was not made a party because as to him there was no
diversity of citizenship, the jury rendered a verdict for the
defendant.
The principal question at issue was the responsibility of
the defendant for the acts of the sub-contractor in damaging
the property of the plaintiff. On appeal, the court of appeals
affirmed the judgment below holding that there was no right
of control nor any exercise of actual control of the sub-con-
tractor by the defendant employer, and since the nature of
the work to be done by the sub-contractor was not ultra
hazardous, the non-delegable duty exception did not apply.
As the Court pointed out in its opinion, the great damage
suffered by the plaintiff was not as the result of any risk
inherent in the nature of the work done, but was the result of
a risk collateral to the fulfillment of defendant's purposes. The
Court found it unnecessary to decide whether a trespass was
committed by the sub-contractor in going onto the right-of-
way of the plaintiff. Since trespass requires a violation of
a possessory right (except perhaps for members of the
possessor's household), there would seem to be no standing on
the part of the plaintiff to maintain an action for trespass
against the sub-contractor, because it held only an easement.
The fee belonged to the United States. Not having obtained
214 [Vol. 14
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol14/iss2/5
SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
permission from the government to remove the earth, absent
any implied permission, King was a trespasser against the
government, but this did not make him a trespasser as to all
the world.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Soper said:
King took no pains to discover the identity of the true
owner, as he was bound to do, and consequently he was
a trespasser ab initio and liable for the injuries caused
by his negligence in the performance of a tortious act.1'
As early as 1610 the Six Carpenters' Case'8 spelled
out the requirement that to have a trespass ab initio the
entry must have been under a privilege granted by law as
distinguished from a license granted by the possessor. In the
first instance, torti6us conduct by a party entering under a
privilege vitiates the privilege and he is a trespasser ab initio.
In the instance of tortious conduct by one entering under a
license granted by a private party, he becomes a trespasser
only as of the time of the breach of the license. In this case
King entered under a license granted by the government in
order to do work on its premises, rather than a privilege
granted by law, therefore his tortious act in exceeding the
limits of the license would make him a trespasser at that
time but not from the beginning, or ab initio. But a tres-
pass by King against the government as the fee holder, wheth-.
er ab initio or not, has no relevance to this case. Even if
plaintiff had suffered injury to his person he would not be
within the class to whom the trespasser would be liable unless
he was a member of the possessor's household or otherwise
closely identified with him. Any trespass to plaintiff's chattel
(the pipeline) requires physical damage, which there ob-
viously was, but also requires intent on the trespasser's.
part.v'a Since there was nothing to indicate any intent to
damage the pipeline, there would seem to be no reason at all
for any application of trespass, either to land, chattel, or
person. Why the dissent would seek to stretch the ancient
17a. Id. at 152 (1961).
18. 8 Co. 146a (1610).
18a. "Under the principle of law that allows recovery for a trespass
to chattels, it is necessary that the defendant have acted for the
purpose of interfering with the chattel, or what is almost the same
thing, that he have acted with knowledge that such would be the
result of his conduct. In other words, he must have intended the
intermeddling." HARPER AND JAmsES, LAW OF TORTS § 2.5 (1956).
19621 215
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doctrine of trespass ab initio18b to make it apply in this case
is hard to understand. The responsibility of the general con-
tractor for the delicts of the sub-contract is the same in the
case of trespass or negligence.
The real issue on appeal was the defendant's degree of
control over King. The dissent finds that defendant "had
prior knowledge of King's act and expressly consented there-
to and accepted the fruits thereof." For support it quotes
from the deposition of King (which was not in evidence) that
he told the two superintendents of defendant where he in-
tended to get the earth fill. But the dissent apparently over-
looked the fact that King also told the superintendents that
he would not start the work until he had a letter of permis-
sion from the Public Service Authority. A careful reading of
the transcript discloses no evidence to support a conclusion
that defendant's superintendents knew that the letter of
permission was not ample authority for King's removal of
the fill from the area under plaintiff's transmission lines.
MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY
In Beasley v. Ford Motor Company1 9 the Supreme Court
reversed a judgment for the plaintiff in an action in which
the plaintiff, wife of the purchaser of a new automobile,
allegedly received injuries from the fact of the automobile's
catching fire while being driven to a football game. None of
the passengers in the automobile received any critical dam-
ages at that time. The fire was under the hood and was
alleged to have caused the plaintiff such fright that she suf-
fered nervousness and other symptoms such as nightmares
and a fear of automobiles. The suit was for $10,000 actual
and punitive damages, but on a motion by the defendant,
consented to by the plaintiff, the issue of punitive damages
18b. For recurring criticism of this doctrine see Reporter's Notes,
RESTATEMENT, (SECOND) TORTS § 214 (1958), Tentative Draft
No. 2: 5. Finally, the disapproval of the whole doctrine by Mr.
Justice Stone in McGuire v. United States, 273 U. S. 95, 47 S. Ct.
259, 71 L. Ed. 556 (1927); and by Holmes, The Path of the Law,
10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897); Ames, History of Trover, 11
Harm. L. Rev. 277, 287 (1898); Pollock, Torts (13th ed.) 411-13;
Salmond, Torts (7th ed.) 245. ("It is to be regretted that a legal
fiction due to the misplaced ingenuity of some medieval pleader
should have thus succeeded in maintaining its existence and op-
pressive operation in modern law"); Bohlen, Effect of Subsequent
Misconduct Upon a Lawful Arrest, (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 841,
846-851.
19. 237 S. C. 506, 117 S. E. 2d 863 (1961).
[Vol. 14
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was withdrawn from the jury. Nevertheless, a verdict of
$10,000 actual damages was returned. The trial court reduced
the verdict to $7,500 by order nisi. Although it is obvious
from the Court's opinion that the evidence of any negligence
on the part of the manufacturer was very slight indeed, there
was testimony by the plaintiff's husband, purchaser of the
automobile, that the defendant's representatives had made
admissions of its fault in the manufacture or inspection of
the automobile resulting in the fire. The Court commented
that no objection had been made to the admission of this
testimony of the plaintiff's husband. In conclusion it set
aside the verdict as excessive and thus not responsive to the
evidence in the case and granted a new trial absolute.
In the case of McLain v. Carolina Power and Light Com-
pany20 the district court directed a verdict for the defendant
and upon appeal to the court of appeals it was affirmed. The
plaintiff was an employee of a construction company which
had a contract with the defendant to rebuild certain power
lines from the defendant's main distribution line to a cotton
gin operated by a customer of the defendant. The plaintiff
was on the top of the pole installing new lines among existing
lines which were "hot," as he knew. He was injured by
coming in contact with one of the "hot" lines. The court re-
cites the facts that established that the new power lines on
which the plaintiff was working while atop the pole could not
have been energized from the defendant's lines. Without re-
viewing this evidence it is sufficient to say that the evidence
as recited by the court leaves no doubt that the directed
verdict was the proper judgment in this case. It should be
added that the plaintiff had previously recovered full benefits
under the Workmen's Compensation Act against his imme-
diate employer who was the construction company doing the
work for the defendant.
TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS
Deece v. Williams21 is a case involving the negligence of the
Highway Department in the operation of a motor vehicle on
the highway. The plaintiff was seated in his car which was
standing behind another vehicle awaiting the opportunity to
proceed up a snow covered hill when the defendant's snow-
20. 286 F. 2d 816 (1961).
21. 237 S. C. 560, 118 S. E. 2d 330 (1961).
1962] 217
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plow, coming from the opposite direction, stopped in the
downhill lane approximately opposite the plaintiff. This was
some two hundred feet below the crest of the hill. A flagman
from the snowplow had been sent to the crest of the hill to
give warning to the oncoming motorists of the blocked road
condition, but before he reached the crest of the hill or at
the time he reached the top of the hill, a tractor-trailer
driven by one Williams came up the hill at such speed that i t
was unable to stop when it was close enough to receive the
warning from the flagman. As a result, it collided with the
back of the truck-snowplow causing it to collide with the
plaintiff's parked car on the other side. In a suit against the
defendant Highway Department and the tractor-trailer, the
jury brought in a verdict for the plaintiff against both de-
fendants. The Highway Department appealed on several
grounds. One ground was that the negligence of the defend-
ant snowplow in stopping where it did was not the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury because the intervening negli-
gence of the tractor-trailer driver was sufficient to break the
chain of causation in causing the injury to the plaintiff. Also
that the stopping of the snowplow at the point below the crest
of the hill was not negligent in that they had no reason to
anticipate the truck coming over the hill at such a speed that
it would not be able to stop before colliding with that vehicle.
The Highway Department also argued that it was not liable
under Section 33-229 of the CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CARO-
LINA, 1952, in that the alleged negligence of the defendant was
a failure to give adequate warning to the oncoming traffic
to avoid the accident, while the statute provides only for li-
ability in connection with the repair of the construction of the
streets or highways. The Court answered this argument with
".. . it is the duty of the Department to keep its highways
in reasonably safe condition for travel and to erect and main-
tain such signs of warnings as may be reasonably necessary
to enable the users of the highways, exercising ordinary care
and prudence, to avoid injury to themselves and others."
There was a discussion of the law regarding the form of the
verdict and the rule in this state which permits the jury to
apportion the damages among joint tortfeasers which is of
general interest but which is not within the scope of this
particular review.
218 [Vol. 14
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In the case of West v. Sowel122 a verdict and judgment
for the plaintiff was affirmed on appeal. Plaintiff was driv-
ing his car along the highway going to work following a
truck driven by a servant of the defendant when the truck
pulled to the left of the center line just far enough for his
left wheels to cross the line and then made a quick cut-
back to the right turning into a road going off to the right
at the intersection without giving any proper signal to the
following motorist, the plaintiff. There was a conflict in the
testimony between the plaintiff and the defendant as to the
exact position of the vehicles when they collided and as to the
signals given and other circumstances with regard to the
accident. However, nothing in this case warrants any com-
ment other than it is a routine traffic accident dispute.
In the case of Hucks v. Sellers23 the plaintiff was injured
in an automobile collision resulting from his car being struck
by a truck driven by the defendant when the plaintiff under-
took to pass the defendant's truck and a second truck which
had been following immediately behind the defendant's truck.
Plaintiff's testimony was that he had been following some
little distance and he pulled out beyond the center line
so as to see if there was any oncoming traffic. Seeing none
he undertook to pass. When he finished passing the first
truck and before he could reach the second truck it turned
to the left without giving any signal and in an effort to
avoid a collision plaintiff pulled off to the left. The two
vehicles collided and plaintiff was seriously injured. The
verdict and judgment for the plaintiff was appealed by
the defendant on the grounds that the plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law in that he had
tried to pass within one hundred feet of an intersection as
prohibited by statute.24 The Court answered that the evi-
dence was susceptible of the inference that plaintiff would
have passed the defendant more than one hundred feet from
the intersection if the truck had not borne to the left and
struck it. The judgment was affirmed.
Guest Statute
Fuller v. Bailey25 was an action by the plaintiff for the
wrongful death of his wife caused by the overturning of an
22. 237 S. C. 641, 118 S. E. 2d 692 (1961).
23. 236 S. C. 239, 113 S. E. 2d 753 (1960).
24. CODE OF LAWS OF SOT=H CAROLINA § 46-388(2) (1952).
25. 237 S. C. 573, 118 S. E. 2d 340 (1961).
19621 219
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automobile belonging to the defendant and in which the de-
fendant and the deceased's wife had been riding when the
accident occurred. There was no direct evidence as to who
was driving the automobile at the time of the accident. Al-
though the defendant survived he had no recollection of the
accident at all; therefore, his testimony could go no further
than his recollection: sometime prior to the accident. How-
ever, the Court found the following circumstances to be
sufficient to support an inference by the jury that the owner
was the driver of the car: the fact that the defendant was the
owner; that he kept his car in good condition; that there
was testimony that he never let others drive it; that deceased
did not like to drive an automobile; and that the deceased
and the defendant were seen half an hour before the accident
and, at that time, the defendant was driving with the deceased
seated in the front seat with him. Further evidence to sup-
port this inference was that the deceased's body showed that
she had collided with the radio which was mounted in the
right side of the dashboard, that the defendant was thrown
clear of the automobile when it overturned and that the left
front door was torn from the car. The Court also found
ample circumstantial evidence as to the necessary reckless-
ness and heedlessness of the defendant in causing the accident
from the facts that the automobile overturned several times,
was thoroughly damaged on all four sides as well as the
bottom and top; and that it had left the highway on a curve
of which there was specific notice given by a flashing warning
light. A verdict of $2,000 actual damages was set aside by the
trial Court as being inadequate and a new trial was granted.
On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed finding no abuse of
discretion. The deceased was a woman thirty-nine years old,
the mother of several children, and there was testimony
that she had a life expectancy in excess of thirty years and
that she had been a good mother and wife.
In the case of Williams v. Clinton"0 a directed verdict for
the defendant was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The
plaintiff was seeking damages for the wrongful death of a
ten year old boy who was killed when riding a bicycle from
an intersecting road into the state highway on which the
defendant was traveling in an automobile. The testimony
was that the deceased rode on his bicycle into the highway
26. 236 S. C. 378, 114 S. E. 2d 490 (1960).
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from a lane running at right angles to the highway and which
was bordered for some distance by a high hedge which pre-
vented his being seen from the highway. The Court con-
cluded that the physical facts supported only one reasonable
conclusion and that was that the decedent's death was caused
by his own contributory negligence in riding into the high-
way at a fast pace without stopping to look before entering
it.
Green v. BoleiO7 is a case in which the defendant's appeal
was on the grounds that plaintiff was contributorily negli-
gent as a matter of law. Plaintiff was injured by defendant's
dump truck loaded with dirt which was being backed upon
a roadway being extended into the swamp for logging opera-
tions. The plaintiff was working as a flagman for a skidder
and was engaged in giving signals to the skidder from those
received from men in the swamp out of which they were
hauling logs by means of a winch and cables. While the plain-
tiff had his back turned and was absorbed in the business
of conveying signals to the skidder, the defendant's truck was
backed along the roadway and into the plaintiff who was
standing in a loading area along the roadway. The defendant
contended that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory neg-
ligence in that he failed to be aware of the presence of the
truck. The Court pointed to several cases in which it has
been held that the failure of one to be aware of the presence
of a truck backed up onto him when he was concentrating
on the job he was doing was not contributory negligence.
Concluding that the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury
the Court affirmed the judgment based on the verdict of the
jury.
The case of Williams v. Kalutz28 involved an accident be-
tween a pedestrian and an automobile at an intersection in
the city of Columbia. The plaintiff appealed from a verdict
for the defendant. The appeal was on the ground that the
trial court erred in refusing to peremptorily instruct the jury
that the undisputed evidence showed liability on the part of
the defendant. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence
and noted that the testimony of one of plaintiff's witnesses
contradicted to some extent the plaintiff's own testimony
as to how the accident occurred. The plaintiff had testified
27. 237 S. C. 1, 115 S. E. 2d 667 (1960).
28. 237 S. C. 398, 117 S. E. 2d 591 (1960).
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that the defendant made a left turn cutting the corner at
great speed and that this caused him to step back which in
turn caused him to lose his balance and that as a result he
collided with the car. The Court pointed to the fact that it
was undisputed that the defendant's automobile never touched
the body of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff had put out his
hand and touched the automobile. After emphasizing the
law that one who has the right of way, which the pedestrian-
plaintiff here undoubtedly did, is not relieved of his duty to
exercise due care under the circumstances, the Court held
that there was ample evidence of the plaintiff's contributory
negligence to take the case to the jury. The judgment was
affirmed.
In the case of Flynn v. Carolina Scenic Stages29 a widow,
eighty-one years of age, in good health but with impaired
hearing alighted from defendant's bus onto the shoulder of
the highway and then attempted to cross the highway in
front of the bus to her destination and was run over and
killed by the bus when it started off to continue on down the
highway. The trial court granted a non-suit upon the grounds
(1) that there was no proof of negligence on the part of the
defendant, and (2) that plaintiff's intestate was guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law. On appeal by the
plaintiff the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case
for a new trial. The following quotation from the case gives
a summary of the Court's reason for reversal:
It may be reasonably inferred that the driver violated
Section 2.10 of the safety regulations issued by the Pub-
lic Service Commission, Volume 7, page 771 of the 1952
Code, which provides: 'No motor vehicle shall be set in
motion until due caution has been taken to ascertain that
the course is clear.' It is for the jury to say whether due
to her impaired hearing the decedent heard the driver's
admonition to go around the back of the bus and after
giving this admonition whether the driver was negligent
in not thereafter observing the movements of decedent,
particularly in view of her age. Since it was raining
and the dirt shoulder of the road was wet and perhaps
slippery, a jury could reasonably conclude that the driver
should have considered the possibility that decedent might
29. 237 S. C. 340, 117 S. E. 2d 364 (1960).
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cross in front of the bus. A factual issue is also pre-
sented as to whether the driver should have seen the de-
ceased as she passed the side door of the bus and went
around in front of it ..... If there were circumstances
justifying a failure to see her, they should be known to
the driver, but he has not testified.30
As in all cases of a non-suit, the evidence was considered
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
In the case of Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America
v. Odomn1 the plaintiff had paid a $10,000 claim for the
death of an employee of Ballinger Electrical Contractors un-
der the Workmen's Compensation Act and having been sub-
rogated to the rights of the decedent-employee brought this
action for the decedent's wrongful death against defendant
and his tractor-trailer truck. Without discussing the novel
Workmen's Compensation aspects of the case which are cov-
ered in the review under that subject, the tort issues in-
volved the question of imputing the negligence of the driver
of the vehicle in which the decedent was a passenger and the
decedent's own contributory negligence.
The deceased was riding in the back of a pickup truck
which had been arranged by the employer for the trans-
portation of workers from their places of residence to the
job site. The back of the truck had been enclosed in canvas
and tin, leaving only a small rear window and a little window
to the front. The deceased was riding in the back of the truck
which was driven by the foreman of his job when it collided
with a tractor-trailer driven by the defendant. The jury was
instructed to find a general verdict and in addition to answer
the following special issue: "Was the death of C. Earl Lyda
caused or brought about through contributory negligence or
contributory wilfullness by C. H. Rogers, the driver of the
pickup truck in which the deceased was riding?" The jury
answered this question in the affirmative. Defendants con-
tended that since the deceased was riding together with other
employees in a vehicle in the course of their employment,
this made them participants in a joint enterprise. Thus,
having a common interest, any negligence on the part of the
driver must be imputed to the other employees. The Court
recognized that there are some decisions which uphold this
30. Id. at 347, 117 S. E. 2d at 367-368 (1960).
31. 237 S. C. 167, 116 S. E. 2d 22 (1960).
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view but noted the great weight of authority to the contrary
and then quoted from the Restatement of Torts 2 which also
expresses a contrary view. Concluding that the driver in. this
instance was a vice-principal or alter-ego of the employer,
and that therefore the deceased certainly had no voice in the
control of the truck nor did he have an equal right with the
driver to direct its movements, the Court found it unnecessary
to resolve the conflict of authority upon the question of the
joint enterprise arising out of the mere use of the vehicle in
the course of employment as the defendant had contended.33
The defendant also argued that the deceased had been negli-
gent in his failure to keep a look out and use care for his own
protection. The Court answered this by pointing out that
there was no evidence that the decedent had any reason to
doubt the competency of the driver nor did he have any
choice as to the place in which he was riding in the truck since
the cab was filled with other people and the only space left
was in the back of the truck. The Court sustained the ruling
of the trial court that as a matter of law the negligence of
the driver could not be imputed to the deceased. It also
sustained the ruling by the trial judge that there was no
evidence of contributory negligence to submit to the jury.
In the case of Roscoe v. Grubb34 plaintiff received a verdict
for $17,500 actual damages in a wrongful death action against
the defendant arising out of an automobile accident. The
trial court reduced the verdict by $3,500 and defendant ap-
pealed. The plaintiff's intestate died on August 3, 1957. The
automobile collision occurred on August 9, 1956. The sole
question on appeal was whether the decedent's death was
proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant re-
sulting in the automobile collision. The testimony showed
that the plaintiff was a man some sixty-three years of age,
and that he had been in rather poor health prior to the time
of the accident. He was diabetic, as well as suffering from
arteriosclerosis. The evidence showed that the intestate's
injuries were trivial but that beginning at the time of the
accident, he constantly worried about the accident and es-
pecially the inability to reach a settlement over it. "Accord-
32. § 491(d) (1934).
33. For an excellent discussion of the South Carolina law on im-
puted negligence see DoAR, IMPuTED NEGLIGENCE IN SOUTH CARO-
lANA, 11 S. C. L. Q. 195 (1959).
34. 237 S. C. 590, 118 S. E. 2d 337 (1961).
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ing to Dr. Perry, Mr. Huntley's symptoms, other than those
of general deterioration as the result of diabetes and arterio-
sclerosis, were primarily those of emotional instability and
worry."3  On November 2, 1956, the intestate was brought
to the doctor's office showing signs of coronary heart attack.
From that time on his deterioration was rapid until it re-
sulted in his death nine months later. During this period:
his mental deterioration was complete; so much so that he
made groundless accusations against his wife; would get
lost in his own home; would at times wander into the highway
and had to be constantly attended. In answer to a question
at the trial, the doctor testified that in his opinion, the
accident accelerated the time of the decedent's death. The
Supreme Court reversed the judgment for the plaintiff and
entered judgment for the defendant finding the evidence in-
sufficient to support a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The
plaintiff had relied upon the case of Padgett v. Colonial
Wholesale Distributing Co.3 6 in which the defendant was
held liable for physical injury brought on by emotional dis-
tress which resulted from the negligent acts of the defendant,
even though there was no physical impact. The Court dis-
tinguished the Padgett case on the ground that the plaintiff's
fright in that case was "a natural, immediate, and foreseeable
result of the negligent operation of the defendant's truck
whereby it crashed into the plaintiff's home .... " while in
this case, the plaintiff's injury was a trivial bruise and in-
dicated no shock, fright or emotional upset as a result.
The worry that respondent would couple to appelants'
negligent act so as to make that act the proximate cause
of the death of his intestate concerned not the negligent
act itself but the decedent's impatience or dissatisfaction
with the progress of negotiations or litigation looking
to settlement of his claims, which included a claim for
damage to his automobile. To uphold his contention
would be to extend the concept of proximate cause far
beyond the scope contemplated in the Padgett case or
any other precedent in this jurisdiction, and, we think,
beyond reason.
7
In support of the above conclusion the Court pointed to
the fact that the doctor testified that the deceased's "acci-
35. Id. at 592-593, 118 S. E. 2d at 338 (1961).
36. 232 S. C. 593, 103 S. E. 2d 265 (1958).
37. 237 S. C. at 595, 118 S. E. 2d at 339 (1961).
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dent" accelerated the process of arteriosclerosis with con-
sequent deterioration and ultimate death, rather than his
"injuries" received in the accident. This distinction is sig-
nificant in the context of the testimony in this case, as the
opinion points out, but it would be unfortunate for the dis-
tinction to be seized upon in subsequent cases to create a
difference where there is none. Perhaps the following addi-
tional quotation from the testimony of the deceased's doctor
will make more obvious the context in which the Court found
the distinction.
Q. I see. So on October 1st you thought he was doing
very nicely.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And as a matter of fact at that time he was entirely
symptom free, wasn't he?
A. As far as his physical symptoms were concerned,
yes, sir.
Q. In other words you mean by that as far as his
physical condition was concerned he was all right so far
as you could see?
A. So far as his physical condition was concerned at
that time I would have to say he was in pretty good
shape, sir.
Q. Right. That was October 1st.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Wasn't it with reference to that same date, October
1, 1956, that you made the statement that he was in as
reasonably good a condition-was in a reasonably good
physical condition for a man of his age?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Considering what you knew of his past record and
so forth?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So I take it, Doctor, that as of that October 1st
date you felt pretty good about the whole thing and
thought that things were working along all right?
A. I felt reasonably good, yes, sir.
Q. So then you didn't have occasion to see him again
until he had an attack of some kind on the second of
November, isn't that right, sir?
A. That is correct I believe, sir.38
38. Record, p. 36.
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